Maryland Injury Law Center

The Maryland Court of Appeals just affirmed a lead paint verdict against the Baltimore Housing Authority.  This is yet another case where a governmental entity sought the refuge of the Local Government Tort Claims Act.   Thankfully, the Baltimore Housing Authority could not avail causing brain damage to a child via this loophole, at least not in this case.

Facts of Case

The plaintiff lived in a Baltimore Housing authority for two years after her birth in 1995.   She was exposed, she alleged, to chipping and peeling lead-based paint.  Her lead level was 13 mcg/dl.  When I defended these cases in the ’90s, we would have rolled our heads at that number.  Now we know better.   A level like this can cause actual injury and can bring a large jury verdict in Baltimore.

The story from here is familiar.  The plaintiff’s mom noticed classic lead-related injuries manifested themselves early: attention issues,  delays in learning to read, and behavioral problems.  Plaintiff’s experts testified that she lost 5-7 IQ points.

The Baltimore Housing Authority put on its usual witnesses – Patrick Connor, Joseph Scheller, Joel Morse, etc. – to argue that the girl was not injured by lead-based paint.

The jury did not buy-in,  awarding $160,000 in future lost wages (which seems low) and $1.1 million in non-economic damages. Under Maryland’s cap for non-economic damages, this portion of the award was reduced to $530,000.  Why so low?  The injuries occurred in 1995 when the cap was much lower. Continue reading

In Pearson v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals earlier this month addressed the important question of which voir dire questions, if requested, must be asked of prospective jurors.  Why am I writing about it?   It might have important ramifications on civil personal injury jury cases.

The case’s facts are simply: Pearson is indicted and convicted for a narcotics offense.  On appeal, he argues that he has been denied a fair trial because he could not ask certain questions during voir dire.  Pearson claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to ask the venire panel:

1. if any member of the panel, or any member’s family, friend, or acquaintance had ever been the victim of a crime; and
2.  if any member of the panel was ever a member of a law-enforcement agency or “kn[e]w anyone who is employed” by a law-enforcement agency.   Both requests had been denied by the trial court.
3. Do any of you have strong feelings about [the crime with which the defendant is charged]?

Maryland only allows questions to be presented during voir dire if the question is “reasonably likely to reveal specific cause for disqualification.”  Maryland only recognizes two specific instances that comprise specific cause for disqualification: (1) a statute disqualifies a prospective juror or (2) a collateral matter is reasonably liable to have “undue influence over a prospective juror.”  Under the second category, which this case addressed, a matter has undue influence if it addresses biases that create a “demonstrably strong correlation” with a mental or emotional state that will improperly influence a juror’s decisions. Continue reading

New Uninsured Motorist and Jury Awarded Zero in Pain and Suffering Damages Opinion

Last week in Keller v. Serio, the Maryland Court of Appeals took yet another look at two issues that have been reoccurring leitmotifs in Maryland appellate opinions: (1) to what extent can we talk about uninsured motorist coverage in an uninsured motorist case and (2) whether a jury can award zero damages when all the facts suggested otherwise.  Keller is a motor vehicle negligence action instituted solely against the at-fault driver.   Negligence was conceded, and the issues at trial were confined to causation and damages. GEICO, although not a party to the action, realized the possibility that, as the plaintiff’s insurer, the plaintiff might get a verdict exceeding the liability coverage.  GEICO intervened in the case.  At trial, GEICO did the “UM potted plant defense” of just sitting at the trial table and doing absolutely nothing.   Plaintiff’s counsel alluded to GEICO during opening statements but thereafter did not mention the insurer, its policy, or anything about UM policies. At the close of the trial, the plaintiff’s counsel sought an instruction clarifying for the jury (a) how UM policies work and how they should not influence an award of damages and (b) clarify any confusion that may have resulted from GEICO’s presence at the trial.   The trial court refused the instruction.   The jury returned $29,355.69 in economic damages, yet $0 in noneconomic damages. That, folks, is what you call a bad verdict.  Plaintiff argued that such a breakdown of damages is inconsistent, illogical, and evidence that the trial court’s failure to give the UM instruction was reversible error.   No one can argue with the former part of that sentence.   It is illogical to say someone incurred nearly $30,000 in medical bills and did not suffer unless the evidence was that the Plaintiff was made of stone.  The question is whether it warrants nullifying the jury’s verdict and whether the uninsured motorist mess played out appropriately.  The Maryland high court said no and yes and shot down the plaintiff”s appeal.

Continue reading

The U.S. District Court for Maryland made a noteworthy ruling in Jackson v. Johnson, a Maryland auto tort case that is an interesting case that involves federal diversity law and interesting plaintiffs’ lawyer tactics in finding their preferred venue for the case.

Plaintiffs’ Venue Tactics on Full Display

The Battleground