Ron Miller is an attorney who focuses on serious injury and wrongful death cases involving motor vehicle collisions, medical malpractice, and products and premises liability. If you are looking for a Maryland personal injury attorney for your case, call him today at 800-553-8082.

This morning I blogged about University of Maryland Medical Systems v. Waldt in one of the longest posts in Maryland Injury Law Center history. Apparently, considering my blog post and the criticisms in the post, the Maryland Court of Appeals withdrew the opinion. (Okay, maybe it did not happen quite that way. But allow me to pretend.)

What does this mean? I have no idea. The Maryland high court substantively changed its opinion a few years back in Erie v. Heffernan on the question of the impact of insurance companies waiving subrogation in uninsured motorist claims. But the court reaffirmed the deleted portions of the opinion in Heffernan in Maurer v. Pennsylvania National. I’m still perplexed by the thinking on all of that to this day. I’m sure there was a logical reason. But the Maryland Court of Appeals does not share its thinking on these things.

Anyway, the Vegas odds are that this means nothing of great substance. I doubt one of the four judges in the majority will flip and join the dissent to make a majority. The changes could just be trivial. But anything is possible and we will have to wait and see.

The Maryland Court of Appeals reached a decision in University of Maryland Medical System v. Waldt, a case that is reverberating among medical malpractice lawyers in Maryland. (Note: In yet another incredible turn, the Maryland high court has – temporarily at least – withdrawn this opinion.) Yet the back story is better than the case. Two of the most prolific lawyers in Maryland’s history tried this case: Steve Snyder and Billy Murphy. As discussed below, Steve Snyder said he would retire if he lost this case on appeal. (I think he will get a takey-backsie on this one.) In the trial, the Baltimore City judge that tried the case had to give this admonition:

“This is it. Last warning to everybody,” she said. “No finger-pointing, children. No stomping your feet. No screaming. No yelling. No dancing around. No calling names. No throwing sticks and stones. No putting gum in each other’s hair.”

So it got out of control. (More on that later.) But this opinion is important; the underlying trial was an epic and personal war, and Maryland malpractice law is much more clear or an abyss of confusion, depending upon who you ask. While you take a breath, let’s talk about the facts.

This is the tragic case of a Mount Airy woman who was paralyzed on her left side as the result of an operation to treat a brain aneurysm. Plaintiff underwent a procedure at the University of Maryland Hospital to treat an aneurysm which caused bleeding that lead to her injuries, according to the evidence offered by Plaintiff’s attorney at trial.

At trial, Plaintiff called an expert to offer opinions both on the standard of care and on informed consent. The trial judge, Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Lynn Stewart, excluded the expert’s testimony because the expert devoted over 20% of his professional activities to activities that directly involve testimony in personal injury claims. (Maryland law requires malpractice experts to spend less than 20% of their time in medical malpractice or other personal injury cases.) Because this was the Plaintiff’s only expert, the court directed judgment in favor of the Defendants.

The expert was not just some random guy. He held positions at Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard, and John Hopkins. The doctor was also not caught up in the medical malpractice testifying racket: he made less than $50,000 a year. He had not, however, seen patients since 2001 and was no longer licensed to practice medicine in the United States. Interestingly, he said he had a medical license in France, but only to write prescriptions for family members. His professional activities included conducting literature peer reviews, reading journals, observing procedures, and discussing patients with former colleagues. His testimony at trial:

Murphy: Now, you testified that you no longer practice medicine but you handle cases for plaintiffs’ lawyers who are suing others for malpractice?

Expert: Yes.

Murphy: That’s all you basically do now except for read journals and go to an occasional meeting, right?

Expert: Yes.

Murphy: So, you are a professional witness, sir, aren’t you?

Slutkin: Objection, your honor.

Judge: Overruled.

Murphy: You are a professional witness, aren’t you, sir?

Expert: I guess I am.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals disagreed that the expert should be disqualified, finding that the evidence showed that the expert did not violate the 20% rule. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and affirmed the judgment.

(Brief intermission: technically, it is the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland and the Court of Appeals of Maryland. But I think it sounds funny.) Continue reading

The Georgia Supreme Court recently ruled in Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group on an interesting issue in medical malpractice cases: can the standard-of-care medical expert be subject to cross-examination about what the expert would have done if the doctor had treated the patient?

(If you are not interested in the nuance of the facts, skip the next two paragraphs to cut to the chase.) Plaintiff went to an ortho for back, neck and arm pain. The ortho prescribed a 30-day regimen of the anti-convulsive drug Tegretol, which was followed by another 30-day regimen when the patient failed to improve. During the second regimen, Plaintiff experienced leg cramps and shortness of breath. Ultimately, she was diagnosed with aplastic anemia, an awful bone marrow disease where the bone marrow does not produce sufficient red blood cells, requiring many a bone marrow transplant. (Marie Curie was thought to have died because of aplastic anemia.) Plaintiff’s lawsuit against her doctor, who belongs to a huge Atlanta orthopedic practice, alleged that Tegretol was the wrong drug to prescribe and that the doctor should have monitored Plaintiff’s blood count during the Tegretol therapy. Had he done so, according to Plaintiff, they could have avoided this terrible disease.

The doctors’ experts admitted that there is medical literature to support blood count monitoring during Tegretol therapy as appropriate but weaseled out by arguing that it was not “mandatory or essential” even though it was both experts’ regular practice. They also fought the doctor’s malpractice lawyer’s favorite alternative argument: it would not have made a difference if he had done what the Plaintiff’s experts said should have been done because blood monitoring would not have detected aplastic anemia.

The key point on appeal was whether the defendant’s experts could be cross-examined on the fact that it was their practice to do the very thing that they testified was not a breach of the standard of care. So the defendant doctor’s expert says in the deposition, “Sure, I do what you say the doctor should have done in this case but the standard of care does not require it.”
The point here is not subtle: Plaintiffs’ lawyers want the jury to conclude that if the defendant’s experts are taking the same precaution that they claim is above and beyond the standard of care, it underscores what the real standard of care is. Think about it. If a doctor testifies that the defendant’s failure to take a precaution conforms with the “acceptable standard of care”, the credibility of that doctor’s testimony is severely diminished if the medical expert concedes on cross-examination that he/she does exactly what the plaintiff contends should have been done.

No one can argue that the standard of care cannot be established by what the defense expert does. But while the expert’s personal practices may not establish the standard of care, if even the doctors selected by the defendant’s malpractice lawyer are doing what the plaintiff says should have been done, it is powerful evidence. This is true in the actual world where most doctors’ opinions about the standard of care are not based on real data but what the doctor believes is—or should be – the standard of care. Continue reading

After putting my kids to bed last night, I looked at Gregg Easterbrook’s Tuesday Morning Quarterback before going to bed. Easterbrook writes on a lot of different topics such as human happiness (an interesting-sounding book I’ve never read), global warming, science, space, theology, and so forth.  So his column during the NFL season is full of digressions about topics unrelated to football. Continue reading

pedestrian accident opinion

Note: This is an older post that was updated in October 2019

The Maryland Court of Appeals decided Abrishamian v. Barbely, a pedestrian accident appeal from Montgomery County after a jury awarded only half of the client’s special damages (medical bills and lost wages) and gave $0.00 for pain and suffering. The Plaintiff loses this appeal and it is not a close call. The court, however, discusses some interesting law is of interest to the Maryland accident lawyer.

The first issue is no issue at all. The plaintiff’s lawyer asked the judge to recuse himself because the judge’s brother represented the defendant 17 years ago and someone else with the same last name as the Defendant ten years ago. I’d love to know how the Plaintiff’s lawyer learned this and I’d also be curious why he would seek recusal for such an attenuated connection. Had the court gone the other way, it would have really brought havoc to the justice system in Mayberry. Would they have to transfer every case to Mount Pilot?   Anyway, we have a legitimate sample motion to recuse on our website if you are interested.

(Brief intermission: one of the great unsolved mysteries of my childhood was the distance from Mayberry to Mount Pilot. Someone once said a four-hour drive, but Barney Fife said it was 12 miles. Barney was not the most credible person but 12 miles is specific and he had no reason to exaggerate, given the context. I just don’t know. In an unrelated story, I may have watched too much television as a child. Let’s just get back to this case.)

The second issue is far more interesting. Defendant’s doctor was asked on cross whether he had a copy of the Plaintiff’s medical insurance card. Plaintiff’s lawyer objected before an answer could be given, and the judge sustained the objection. Plaintiff’s lawyer argued the trial judge should have granted a mistrial because the question violated collateral source rule. This is a long-shot argument—a mistrial is not out of the question if the question was inappropriate, but it is a Dr. Sam Beckett quantum leap from that to a mistrial as a matter of law. (The court also noted that a question may not be “evidence” subject to the collateral source rule.) Continue reading

In response to a call from one doctor for medical malpractice reform in Montana, Thomas C. Bulma, a Missoula lawyer, points out the following facts:

  • Only one Montana dentist has been the subject of a lawsuit in Montana in the past 10 years. The dentist prevailed.
  • Only one podiatrist was sued. The podiatrist prevailed.

The new popular wisdom that gained currency last year is that doctors who apologize for their mistakes are less likely to face a medical malpractice lawsuit than doctors who refuse to come clean. This supports what medical malpractice lawyers have long claimed: patients are often most angered by concealment of the malpractice and the concern that it will happen again to another patient.

KevinMD reports today an even more updated conventional wisdom, citing a study presented in the Journal of General Internal Medicine that says there is likely no correlation between a patient’s intent to bring a medical malpractice lawsuit and whether the doctor apologized.

medical malpracticeI question the study’s methodology, which relied on videos of actors pretending to be doctors with people trying to put themselves in the shoes of malpractice victims. A controlled study like this really takes the emotion out of a case and ignores the powerful dynamics of a relationship between a doctor and a patient (and the abject suffering experienced by most medical malpractice plaintiffs). You can’t believe the manufacturer in a “make-believe” study and expect meaningful data that translates to the actual world.

I had a great morning. I arrived excited and ready to attack the day. This was the email in my in-box:

name: George Hossfeld
email: EmrgncyMD@[withheld] phone: ___________________
Interested In: You obviously do not have a clue re the mind of a doctor. We are ethical, moral and exist to help patients. You are immoral, unethical, and whores to the dollar. I hope your family needs a doctor and one is not there because vermin like you have driven them away
.

Let’s start with the petty. We have a guy whose email address is his job as an emergency room doctor. Proves nothing. But it makes you wonder if Dr. Hossfeld is just a little too excited about being Mr. Doctor. People like that scare me. I’m not a fan of summarizing my life in an email address or a bumper sticker. If I did, it would have the names of my family and friends on it and that would be too long to type.

Let’s move on from the petty to the substantive because I could read too much into an email address. We have four sentences, so let’s break them down and over analyze them to get ready for the NFL pre-game shows on Sunday. We will leave out the “hysterical laughter at every attempt at a joke from everyone in the studio” part: Continue reading

On Friday, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed a $3 million jury verdict in Cecil County v. Dorman. That statement over-magnifies the ruling. The jury verdict of $3 million is misleading because Maryland’s Local Government Tort Claim Act limited the actual verdict to $200,000. But the legal issues presented in the case interest Maryland accident attorneys who are looking for creative solutions to limited insurance coverage in catastrophic accident cases. This case closed down one potential defendant: the utility pole that has been there forever should not have been there when my client hit it.

The case involved a motorcycle accident that occurred near the intersection of Nottingham Road and Pulaski Highway (Route 40). Plaintiff suffered severe injuries that required the amputation of his right leg. The defendant driver’s negligence was not in serious question, but claims were maintained against Verizon and Delmarva Power and Light Company regarding the location of the utility pole that Plaintiff had hit, which had exacerbated Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff’s lawyer argued that the location of the pole was unsafe. Plaintiff’s accident lawyer further argued that is Cecil County’s duty to maintain its roadways in good repair and free from hazards or defects was ongoing so the fact that the pole had been put in 40 years ago was no defense. There is a duty imposed on Cecil County when a utility pole is in such proximity to the road that it was an “accident waiting to happen.” Continue reading

There is a split of opinion among personal injury lawyers whether plaintiffs should propound interrogatories before or after taking depositions, particularly in a case where there is a significant dispute as to liability.

When looking at this question, it is important to acknowledge that defense lawyers in personal injury cases are like actors: there are many Jack Nicholsons and Meryl Streeps and there are also a lot of folks who call themselves actors but their acting skills do not rise to even Skinamax quality.

So some lawyers are going to learn the case when they get the file and get their client-ready, regardless of the stage of the case. Others are going to not know the file at all and introduce themselves to the client and the case 10 minutes before the depositions. The theory behind waiting to serve interrogatories is that if you get the latter type of defense attorney, the defendant will take positions that don’t comport with the facts, logic or good strategy because they have not looked at the nuances of the case. Arguably, this logic would even hold up against a top-notch lawyer because every lawyer, even well-prepared lawyers, sees a case with a clearer lens on the courthouse steps than they do when preparing for a deposition.

Contact Information