Ron Miller is an attorney who focuses on serious injury and wrongful death cases involving motor vehicle collisions, medical malpractice, and products and premises liability. If you are looking for a Maryland personal injury attorney for your case, call him today at 800-553-8082.

The Maryland Injury Law Center received today the following comment from an emergency room doctor in southern Maryland regarding my blog post on the alleged shortage of doctors in Maryland:

“You are guilty of not supporting your assumptions with data as well. I practice emergency medicine in St. Mary’s County and Southern Maryland DOES have a doctor shortage problem. I know, I work here. I have many patients that cannot get into a primary care physician or a specialist. Talk to any hospital CEO at Civista, St. Marys, or Calvert Hospital and they will all tell you the same thing. While the shortage may not be evenly distributed about the state, the shortage is real and affects real people. You mentioned that you do not know anyone that has not been able to see a doctor. I imagine that in your nice neighborhood, your friends from the club, your colleagues have all been able to find doctors. You are out of touch with the rest of Maryland. If you are waiting for ‘one person to tell you they cannot find the medical care they need’ come visit me in St. Mary’s county and I will introduce you to many. Maybe that will convince you. By the way, I am not a member of MedChi, have not attended any MedChi meetings and have no other motive to respond to your comment other than your gross misstatements that are baseless.”

First, I appreciate the comment. I publish every comment I get, even those that, unlike this one, insult me personally. This blog slants toward plaintiffs and victims because I am slanted that way. But I try hard to make this a forum where I am writing as a human being who sees the world as I do, not as a plaintiffs’ lawyer’s manifesto.

lead paint verdictsThe Maryland Daily Record reports that a Baltimore jury awarded $82,000 to an 8-year-old boy who only briefly exhibited elevated levels of lead in his blood.

In May 2000, the boy’s level was four micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood. In December, his level rose to 29 micrograms. I am a parent of three small children and, as a defense attorney, have defended lead paint cases in Maryland. If my child had a lead level of 29, I would absolutely freak out. Here, thank God, as quickly as the level rose, it fell. By December 28, the boy’s level was 19. It fell to 12.6 in February and then down to 8.6 in March.

The Plaintiff’s lead paint lawyer conceded that he was doing well. Apparently, he was doing great in school and he tested in the 97th percentile for reading, but there is no question lead harms children. Should the fact that the child is doing well be a defense? We know lead paint harms children and we know this child, while doing great now, experienced cognitive delays. Would he be in the 99th percentile but for the lead? So I think the jury’s verdict was probably very reasonable (although you would have to be on the jury to consider an opinion).

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals decided the Titan v. Advance case yesterday. Titan is a case where the Plaintiff alleged negligent repair of a roof that led to the clogging of a roof drain, which then resulted in the Plaintiff’s premises to flood. It is located on Eastern Avenue in Baltimore, Maryland, at Crown Industrial Park. After a three-day trial, the jury found in favor of the Defendants.

As you might have expected, the amount of rain after the job was completed was relevant. Defendants introduced, over objection, a certified copy of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s weather reports from Baltimore-Washington Airport, which reported rain patterns at the airport between the day the roofing work was completed and the date of the flooding off the roof. Plaintiff objected that the weather at Baltimore Washington Airport on that day was not relevant because it was 10 miles from the site.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Arrie W. Davis, found that the documents were relevant because the parties disputed the amount of rainfall. The court further found that despite the length of the documents, the jury could reasonably interpret the recorded rainfall amounts and the court needed no expert opinion to explain the documents. As to the 10 miles between the Baltimore-Washington Airport and the site of the property, the court concluded this went to the weight of the evidence as opposed to admissibility.

Last month, retired Howard County Judge Dennis M. Sweeney wrote an article in a series of articles he is writing for the Daily Record. The latest article discusses voir dire. One point Judge Sweeney makes is that judges have an aversion to proposed voir dire questions that seem to be uniform in every case the lawyer tries. In my last trial, the defense lawyer did not change the names of the parties from the voir dire that they had apparently cut and pasted from the last case. Judge Sweeney writes that they may poison the trial judge to ignore specific voir dire questions—usually put at the end of voir dire consistent with cut-and-paste practices—that may have more merit.

The article also points to dicta in Landon v. Zorn, 389 Md. 206 (2005), a failure-to -diagnose medical malpractice case in which the Plaintiffs appealed a defense verdict. The basis for the appeal was the trial judge’s refusal to ask whether the jury panel had any “preconceived opinion or bias or prejudice in favor of, or against Plaintiffs in personal injury cases in general and medical malpractice cases in particular?” The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Clayton Greene, Jr. that it is the responsibility of the attorneys to “propound voir dire questions designed to elicit potential bias from jurors, and not to bootstrap a tort reform argument on appeal to a general question inquiring into any potential ‘bias or prejudice’ against plaintiffs in personal injury or medical malpractice cases.” But as Judge Sweeney notes, the court indicated that the lower court may have had an obligation to include a question more tailored to the plaintiff in that case if requested by the attorneys. Judge Sweeney then said that this “places counsel in the position of having to ask the question in many different formulations to hit on the one that may be correct and specific enough.”

But Maryland trial judges love to rush through voir dire as it is, so I shuttered to imagine giving multiple formulations to these judges. I wrote to Judge Sweeney and asked if he had any solution to the Landon v. Zorn problem of having to ask in many formulations to find the most appropriate, noting my concern about how multiple formulations of the same question might risk annoying the court. Judge Sweeney offered this practical response:

Point of Law has an interesting blog post on a recent study regarding contingency fees. I found two conclusions of interest.

First, the study found that people who had the financial means to pay attorneys’ fees upfront still preferred a contingency fee arrangement, even if that arrangement meant they were ultimately likely to pay more in fees. Apparently, the experiment included affluent trial lawyers as imaginary plaintiffs, and they too chose the contingency fee agreement over the hourly billing rate. The authors explain that our instinct to be “loss adverse” is the principal reason people prefer a contingency fee arrangement, even if they expect it will cause higher legal fees. This theory may also explain why people are far more unhappy when they lose $100 than happy when they find $100.

I suspect another reason for this preference that the authors do not point to is that it is less stressful to have some level of cost certainty. I know I dislike paying anyone by the hour, especially when I do not know how many hours attorneys will expend. I would rather they give me an all-inclusive price to solve the problem.

The New York Personal Injury Lawyer Blog tipped me off to an article in the Chicago Tribune last week about a patient who sued her eye doctor and his assistant alleging that the doctor’s assistant licked the patient’s toes during her eye exam in Skokie, Illinois.

Apparently, the Plaintiff went to get an eye exam. The doctor’s assistant entered and dimmed the lights and told the plaintiff he would perform a “strip test.” He placed a strip over her eyes and told her she would need to keep her eyes closed for 5 to 7 minutes. Feeling something on her feet, she opened her eyes and saw him licking her toes. The assistant reportedly replied, “I’m sorry, I’m sorry, but I was checking your sugar level.”

Many personal injury lawyers will disagree with me, but this is my definition of a frivolous medical malpractice action. Her damages were the liked toes. Obviously, this is not good, and if it happened to my wife, I might be pretty annoyed and want to do something about it. The Plaintiff did something about it. She pressed charges, and the guy was convicted and sentenced to a year of probation. But now she wants to profit from that moment of having her toes licked and she wants to drag the doctor into it, even though there are no allegations the doctor knew or should have known that this guy was the nutcase that he apparently was. Who knows what a jury will give her, but she does not want me on that jury.

How many times have you Googled for one purpose and then found something interesting unrelated to what you were looking for? This weekend, looking for something unrelated, I found a New Yorker article from two years ago on medical malpractice in the comments section of a blog. It is an interesting and somewhat balanced article by a doctor writing about the country’s medical malpractice problem. I disagree with his conclusions but it really is a wonderfully well-written article that points out the paradox inherent in medical malpractice cases. Three quotes in the article I found of particular interest:

“Malpractice attorneys are hardly the most impartial assessors of care, but medicine has offered no genuine alternative because physicians are generally unwilling to take financial responsibility for the consequences of their [medical malpractice]. Indeed, the one argument that has persuaded many doctors to be more forthright about mistakes is that doing so might make patients less likely to sue.”
“I watch a lot of baseball, and I often find myself thinking about the third baseman’s job. In a season, a third baseman will have about as many chances to throw a man out as I will to operate on people. The very best (players like Mike Lowell, Hank Blalock, and Bill Mueller) do this perfectly almost every time. But two per cent of the time even they drop the ball or throw it over the first baseman’s head. No one playing a full season fails to make stupid errors. When he does, the fans hoot and jeer. If the player’s error costs the game, the hooting will turn to yelling. Imagine, though, that if every time Bill Mueller threw and missed it cost or damaged the life of someone you cared about. One error leaves an old man with a tracheostomy; another puts a young woman in a wheelchair; another leaves a child brain-damaged for the rest of her days. His teammates would still commiserate, but the rest of us? Some will want to rush the field howling for Mueller’s blood. Others will see all the saves he’s made and forgive him his failures. Nobody, though, would see him in quite the same way again. And nobody would be happy to have the game go on as if nothing had happened. We’d want him to show sorrow, to take responsibility. We’d want the people he injured to be helped in a meaningful way. This is our situation in medicine, and litigation has proved to be a singularly unsatisfactory solution. It is expensive, drawn-out, and painfully adversarial. It also helps very few people. Ninety-eight per cent of families that are hurt by medical errors don’t sue. They are unable to find lawyers who think they would make good plaintiffs, or they are simply too daunted. Of those who do sue, most will lose. In the end, fewer than one in a hundred deserving families receive any money. The rest get nothing: no help, not even an apology.”
“What would most doctors do if someone close to them was hurt by a medical error? In a recent national survey, physicians and non-physicians were given the following case: A surgeon orders an antibiotic for a sixty-seven-year-old man undergoing surgery, failing to notice that the patient’s chart says that he is allergic to the drug. The mistake is not caught until after the antibiotic is given, and, despite every effort, the patient dies as a result. What should be done? Unlike fifty per cent of the public, almost none of the physicians wanted the surgeon to lose his license. Medical care requires that a thousand critical steps go right every day, and none of us would have a license if we were punished every time we faltered. At the same time, fifty-five per cent of the physicians said that they would sue the surgeon for malpractice.” Continue reading

The Washington Post and the Baltimore Sun wrote yesterday about a recent report that Maryland faces a doctor shortage that may well become severe by 2015.

We already have a shortage of doctors, and things will get worse? I don’t know anyone—family, friend, or client—who could not find a medical doctor when they needed one. Ever.

Who wrote the report? Well, if you go to the fourth paragraph of the Washington Post article, you learn that our good friends at MedChi, the Maryland State Medical Society, commissioned the report. These are the same folks who warned of impending doom for doctors as the result of escalating medical malpractice costs. The same folks that came out with data supporting the future abyss.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found in a 2-1 decision last month that a reduction of 30 percent in the survival chances of a woman with uterine cancer as the result of medical malpractice is not actionable as a matter of Maryland law.

Marcantonio v. Moen is a case about the delay in diagnosing cancer. Plaintiff claimed that his wife died as the result of her doctors misinterpreting a sonogram and failing to order sufficient tests to follow up on the woman’s symptoms. Because of this failure to diagnose, the Plaintiff claims that his wife’s chances of survival went down from 80% to 50%-60%. So while she was statistically likely to beat cancer even with the malpractice, she died.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that the “major issue to be decided is whether proof that a health care provider was responsible for a twenty to thirty percent reduction in the decedent’s chance of survival suffices to prove that the malpractice caused the death. We shall hold that it is not,” wrote Judge James P. Salmon.

There is an editorial in this month’s New England Journal of Medicine on Riegel v. Medtronic, the preemption case that the Supreme Court shall soon side that has pharmaceutical and medical device companies sitting on the edge of their seats.

Quick background: A man suffered injuries when a balloon catheter exploded during an angioplasty. The manufacturer, Medtronic, moved to dismiss the case because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1976 immunizes Medtronic from any state law torts claims for medical devices because the device received pre-market approval from the FDA.

The authors of the New England Journal of Medicine editorial set forth the history and rationale of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Device Act, pointing out that arguments, in this case, are just another version of the same arguments Medtronic offered in Medtronic v. Lohr, a case in which the Supreme Court rejected the preemption of state court claims arguments. The authors note that this case addresses “just how reliable the FDA pre-marketing approval process is and how much weight to give it.” The authors do not explicitly answer this question, but it is hard to argue that the FDA is an effective watchdog of pharmaceutical and medical device companies.

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